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Free trade, fair trade, strategic trade, and protectionism in the U.S. Congress, 1987–88

Stanley D. Nollen and Dennis P. Quinn

Trade policy debates in the United States historically have centered on free trade versus protectionism. As the U.S. trade deficit worsened in the late 1980s, two additional types of trade policy were proposed in Congress and, in some instances, enacted into law: fair trade and strategic trade.¹

What gave rise to these new types of trade policy? We suggest that, first, as international economic conditions facing U.S. firms and their employees changed in the 1980s, the older coalitions of support for or against free trade fragmented and, second, that new coalitions of interests took root. We use voting patterns in the U.S. Congress as a prism to break up and analyze the institutional and ideological influences—as well as the market conditions and economic interests—that motivate trade policy legislation; we also use the information gained to assess the role of the U.S. executive in determining trade policy during this period.

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1. The various types of trade policy proposals in Congress are reviewed in Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Trade Policy: Free Trade–Fair Trade and Their Discontents* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 23 April 1992). The main pieces of trade legislation enacted into law during this period were the 1988 U.S.–Canada Free-Trade Agreement, the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Bill and its numerous amendments, and the U.S. First amendment to the Strategic Defense Initiative Research and Development Amendment to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act (Senate vote no. 250, 1987; House vote no. 114, 1987; see Appendix B).

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To test our ideas, we (1) elucidate a typology that distinguishes among types of trade policy, (2) develop expectations from research literature, and (3) empirically analyze all thirty Senate roll call trade votes and all twenty House of Representatives roll call trade votes in the One Hundredth Congress of the United States (1987–88). Our results demonstrate that the coalitions of support for or opposition to the four types of trade policy differ. Members of Congress who support fair trade include liberals and those with strong financial support from international businesses. In contrast, members who favor protectionism are those who receive money from domestically oriented businesses and labor unions and who represent constituencies with high unemployment or comparative cost disadvantage. Fair trade and strategic trade are not simply protectionism in disguise.

Our results are also consistent with the view that changes in market conditions in the 1980s led to very rapid changes in U.S. economic interests and ultimately in trade legislation.² A related conclusion is that part of the effect of changed market conditions is mediated through political partisanship, which is now unambiguously central to U.S. trade politics. Ideas and institutions, however, as modeled in our analysis also influence legislative outcomes. Any conclusion about the centrality of market forces to U.S. trade policy is thereby qualified.

Distinguishing among trade policies

Our focus is on the conditions that led Congress in the late 1980s to initiate and pass new forms of trade policy. In the 1980s, after fifty years of relative inactivity, Congress formally re-asserted influence over trade policy. The One Hundredth Congress of 1987–88 voted on more trade bills and amendments than any other postwar Congress, and most of those votes were on legislation that originated in Congress, not with the executive.³

Earlier, following the 1930 Hawley–Smoot Tariff Act, Congress famously insulated itself and U.S. trade policy from U.S. protectionist pressures by establishing various commissions and agencies—particularly the International Trade Commission (ITC)—to which the domestic interests hurt by imports

2. For a review of various perspectives on why governments adopt trade policies, see John S. Odell, “Understanding International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis,” *World Politics* 43 (October 1990), pp. 130–67. A fourth explanatory variable reviewed by Odell, global political-economic structure, is not explicitly modeled here.

3. I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992), pp. 91–97. We include the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act and the 1988 Textile and Apparel Bill in our count. Legislative activity increased from twelve roll call votes on trade matters in the Senate during 1980–84 to fifty-one Senate roll call votes during 1985–89; similarly, the House held twenty-five and thirty-six votes, respectively, during those periods. These numbers are based on data from *Congressional Quarterly Roll Call*, various issues, 1980–89.

could appeal for relief.⁴ Firms in the steel industry, for example, were able to gain protection from imports by precipitating numerous antidumping investigations of foreign competitors and by lobbying the executive branch for voluntary export restraint agreements.⁵ These institutional arrangements for protection outside Congress and their enabling legislation have been well-studied by scholars in international political economy, and we shall not examine here the institutions of administered protection.

Bills and amendments of the One Hundredth Congress (with one exception) proposed that government intervene to some extent into trade affairs. The types of intervention varied, however, and met different legislative fates. Those bills that had features of classical protectionism almost always passed in Congress by wide margins but were blocked by sustained presidential vetoes. Trade interventions that were labeled “fair trade” or “strategic trade” by their supporters were, however, enacted into law. Among such bills was the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill.

Free trade

We begin our analysis by distinguishing among four types of trade policy.⁶ The first of these types, free trade—the desideratum of neoclassical economics—is the extension of the regime of free markets to the international sector. The objective of free trade is to achieve maximum production and consumption possibilities for citizens of all nations, given each nation’s resource endowments. It follows that the main task of a government in support of free trade policy is to prevent market imperfections so that markets work. Operationally, free trade policies are those that reduce or eliminate tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and regulations that change or administer the price, quantity, or features of traded products or services.

Free trade policies have a political dimension apart from their economic effects. All Presidents since 1932 have been free traders, and this is currently the case. Thus, we count as free trade proposals bills and amendments that

4. See Destler, *American Trade Politics*, especially the chapter entitled “The Old System: Protection from Congress”; and Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Ann Lenway, “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional–ITC Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (September 1989), pp. 303–27. Congress also used “fast track” legislative procedures, which limited amendments to trade agreements, to shield itself from constituent protectionist pressures.

5. For a review of this tactic as it relates to the steel industry, see Stefanie Ann Lenway and Douglas A. Schuler, “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry,” in Robert E. Baldwin, ed., *Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 75–80.

6. For recent reviews of trade policy, see Robert E. Baldwin, “Are Economists’ Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid?” *Journal of Economic Literature* 30 (June 1992), pp. 804–29; Winfried Ruigrok, “Paradigm Crisis in Trade Theory,” *Journal of World Trade* 25 (February 1991), pp. 77–89; and Neil Vousden, *The Economics of Trade Protection* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

either offer unencumbered authority to the President to negotiate reductions in trade barriers or bills and amendments that locate decision-making authority regarding trade disputes between the United States and other countries with the President.⁷

Free trade is different from fair trade in that actions by foreign governments to protect their own domestic industries do not imply a need for home country retaliation. Milton Friedman put the case for unilateral free trade as follows:

The method that . . . [the U.S. has] tried to adopt [to achieve free trade] is reciprocal negotiation of tariff reductions with other countries. . . . [This] fosters an erroneous view of the basic problem. It makes it appear as if tariffs help the country imposing them but hurt other countries, as if when we reduce a tariff we give up something good and should get something in return in the form of a reduction in the tariffs imposed by other countries. In truth, the situation is quite different. Our tariffs hurt us as well as other countries. We would be benefited by dispensing with our tariffs even if other countries did not.⁸

As a practical matter, many defenders of free trade recognize that unilateral free trade, while potentially welfare maximizing, is politically unstable.⁹ Two alternatives to unilateral free trade are the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which provides the basis for multilateral full reciprocity, and bilateral free trade agreements. In the One Hundredth Congress of 1987–88, only one unambiguously free trade bill was proposed; the U.S.–Canada Free Trade Agreement.¹⁰ The agreement offered national treatment to firms within the trade area and replaced a complex system of trade that in many sectors was fair (according to the definition below) but not free.

Protectionism

The ultimate objective of classical protectionism is to block or slow down the economic adjustments that otherwise would have to be made because of international trade. The adjustments that are deferred include geographical relocation of production, change in product lines, and displacement of labor.

7. We follow the common practice of regarding any transfer of authority from the President to the U.S. Trade Representative, who answers (at least in part) to Congress, as a move toward trade protection. See Richard J. Whalen and R. Christopher Whalen, *Trade Warriors: The Guide to the Politics of Trade and Foreign Investment* (Washington, D.C.: Whalen Company, 1990), pp. 26–32.

8. Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

9. See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, *Protectionism* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).

10. The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Bill had free trade aspects, such as the extension of presidential authority to enter into trade barrier reduction negotiations. Numerous restricting amendments—as well as its 301 provisions—were, however, enacted into the final law. Destler claims that moves to toughen Section 301 were the heart of the 1988 Trade Act. See Destler, *American Trade Politics*, p. 127.

Efficiency in the aggregate is sacrificed in the interest of higher income and more employment for the protected sector.¹¹

The actions that the beneficiaries of protectionism seek include tariffs, quotas, and other forms of administered protection.¹² A distinguishing feature of protectionism is that it unilaterally increases the price or restricts the quantity of foreign goods sold in any state. Recent examples of protectionism in the United States include quotas to limit the import of Japanese cars during the 1980s, the repeated attempts in Congress to reduce imports of textiles and apparel through the use of quotas, and “buy America” provisions in defense contracts. In the One Hundredth Congress, protectionist bills and amendments comprised the most commonly proposed form of trade intervention. Many congressional votes were associated with the Textile and Apparel Bill, which sought import restrictions on numerous product markets in footwear and clothing.

Fair trade

The objective of fair trade policy is to combat unfair trading practices by other countries in order to restore outcomes that would prevail under free(er) trade. The intended outcomes are gains for U.S. firms in foreign markets as well as prevention of loss for U.S. firms in the domestic market. In some sense, fair trade policies have been part of the U.S. trade policy repertoire since the nineteenth century. As I. M. Destler and Judith Goldstein each note, the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 and the 1934 Reciprocal Tariff Act are forms of fair trade.¹³ The early forms of U.S. fair trade policy sought to prevent dumping by foreign firms in the U.S. market or to gain access to foreign markets for U.S. commodities. For example, access to the U.S. market for Brazilian coffee producers was made contingent on access to the Brazilian market for U.S. wheat producers, an example of Heckscher–Ohlin type trade.

Modern fair trade policies go further. The starting point of modern fair trade policy is reciprocity in similar or related product markets. For example, the United States might begin with a demand for access to foreign markets for semiconductors in return for foreign access to the U.S. semiconductor market.

11. Optimal tariffs are a form of protectionism that might under some circumstances increase the real income of the citizens of large countries like the United States. One estimate suggests that tariffs of 150 percent might be the optimal U.S. tariff. See John Wallley, *Trade Liberalization Among Major World Trading Areas* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), cited in Baldwin, “Are Economists’ Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid?”

12. Alan M. Rugman and Andrew Anderson, *Administered Protection in America* (New York: Croom Helm, 1987).

13. See Destler, *American Trade Politics*, especially chap. 2; and Judith Goldstein, “The Political Economy of Trade: The Institutions of Protection,” *American Political Science Review* 80 (May 1986), pp. 161–84. See also David Lake, *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

Fair trade policy commonly follows from trade disputes in which U.S. firms and the firms of the target country are competing for market share in the United States, but in which U.S. producers allegedly are blocked from the foreign market by the industry's policies or by exclusionary trade barriers.

These new fair trade policies appeared in legislation proposed during the One Hundredth Congress (traditional antidumping measures typically are administrative actions). The Omnibus Trade Bill and its numerous amendments are fair trade proposals. The Super 301 section of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill requires the U.S. government (1) to identify foreign markets both where prices are not determined by market forces and where U.S. firms are adversely affected and (2) to use either bilateral negotiations or unilateral U.S. action to bring down barriers to U.S. products in those targeted foreign markets.¹⁴ The exclusionary trade and industrial policy practices of Japan and other East Asian nations have been particular targets of congressional fair trade policies. As Goldstein notes, modern U.S. fair trade policies arise in part from concerns about foreign "cheating" in the postwar trade regime.¹⁵

While this description of U.S. fair trade policy casts it in a welfare-maximizing light, readers in Tokyo or Paris might wonder if fair trade is only what the United States defines as fair to the United States. At times, U.S. politicians employ the rhetoric of fair trade to mask their protectionism, though the disguise is often thin. For example, the 1987 Gephardt amendment to the Omnibus Trade Bill proposed numerical targets that would be used to assess penalties on countries with trade surpluses with the United States, but the political rhetoric offered in support of this protectionist measure was that of fair trade.

Moreover, determining if trade is unfair is difficult. Witness the debate over why Japanese consumers are purchasing few U.S.-made telephones or cars: is it because U.S. products are inferior in price and quality to Japanese products, because the Japanese government established exclusionary policies, because private channels of distribution tend to block non-Japanese products from the Japanese market, or do any of these reasons apply? Further, the capacity of governments (especially a fragmented government such as that of United States) both to judge claims fairly and to resist rent-seeking interest groups is very much questioned.

Finally, thanks to congressional logrolling, a fair trade bill might easily be swamped by protectionist riders. This may account in part for the strong

14. Destler offers an extraordinarily comprehensive review of all Section 301 investigations from 1 July 1975 to 28 November 1990; see his *American Trade Politics*, pp. 404–31. See also Stephen D. Krasner, *Asymmetries in Japanese–American Trade: The Case for Specific Reciprocity*, monograph no. 32 (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute for International Studies, 1987).

15. For a discussion of U.S. fair trade policies, see Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy," *International Organization* 43 (Winter 1988), pp. 179–218, especially pp. 197–209.

opposition to fair trade bills such as Super 301 by congressional supporters of free trade.¹⁶ Whether or not fair trade is really different in political practice from protectionism is thus an open question.

Strategic trade

Strategic trade is a new addition to trade policy thinking.¹⁷ The objective of strategic trade policy is to promote the competitiveness of domestic firms in key industries at the expense of foreign firms, either to enhance the nation's economic well-being or its military security. Strategic trade is a form of industrial policy that offers exclusionary benefits to selected domestic firms through nontariff barriers.

The argument that proponents of strategic trade offer is that some technologies give rise to product lines that are produced within global oligopolies in which only a few very large companies in the world can compete. These product lines are produced with or embody a high level of advanced technology that changes rapidly; they have large capital requirements and extensive economies of scale and scope; they demand a high level of expenditure on risky research and development (R&D). The economic characteristics of these product lines mean that firms that enter early into the market are more likely to succeed than firms that enter late. Supporters of strategic trade policy conclude that in such a global oligopoly, it is better for a country to be a producer than a consumer.¹⁸

The strategic trade policies proposed during 1987–88 offer support or protection either to product lines that are in established high-profile, high-status industries (such as microelectronics and aerospace) or to emerging technologies (such as high-definition television; HDTV) that are argued to be “platform” technologies for many related product lines.¹⁹ The defining feature of strategic trade policy is the government's offer to domestic firms of subsidies, exclusionary contracts, or other targeted benefits in order to support trade-related technology development in nascent product markets. We also regard

16. In return for their continued support for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the free trade bloc of Republicans in the House of Representatives extracted a promise from President Clinton that he would not append to NAFTA the Super 301 provision, which House Republicans oppose and which lapsed in 1991. See Ann Devroy and Peter Behr, “Sugar-Producing States Targeted by Clinton in Drive for NAFTA Votes,” *The Washington Post*, 3 November 1993, p. A4.

17. See Paul Krugman, ed., *Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986); J. David Richardson, “The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy,” *International Organization* 44 (Winter 1990), pp. 107–35; and Baldwin, “Are Economists' Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid?”

18. Steven Cohen and John Zysman, *Manufacturing Matters* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

19. See Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *High-Definition Television and Advanced Video Information Systems* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 November 1990); and Ellis S. Krauss and Simon Reich, “Ideology, Interests, and the American Executive: Toward a Theory of Foreign Competition and Manufacturing Trade Policy,” *International Organization* 46 (Autumn 1992), pp. 857–97.

proposals to establish agencies or institutions that would provide the aforementioned subsidies or grants as forms of strategic trade policy contained within broader industrial policy.

One example of a strategic trade proposal is the Glenn amendment to the Senate and House versions of the Fiscal 1988–89 Defense Authorization Act, which barred foreign firms from being awarded Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) R&D contracts if U.S. firms could perform “competent” work at the same or lower price.²⁰ As this example shows, strategic trade policies are sometimes implemented in legislation that is not overtly trade related.

The assumptions and conclusions of strategic trade theory are by no means universally accepted. Free trade proponents argue that strategic trade is a version of industrial policy that is unlikely to produce social welfare gains.²¹ Furthermore, the strategic trade policies of other countries are the very policies to which the U.S. proponents of modern fair trade are reacting. European Union (EU) subsidization of Airbus is just such a case: that subsidization has provoked charges in the United States of unfair EU trading practices.

As the Airbus example suggests, strategic trade is distinguishable from fair trade in that strategic trade policy does not aim primarily to achieve U.S. firms’ access to foreign markets by threatening to restrict foreign firms’ access to U.S. markets. Quite the contrary, in the words of Pietro Nivola, the aim of strategic trade policy is

to create competitive advantage by subsidizing industries that may generate surplus profits, premium wages, and technological spillovers to the rest of the economy. In principle, a nation that successfully targets such rent-yielding industries can raise its national income at the expense of its trading partners.²²

In fact, U.S. strategic trade policies undercut the logic of U.S. fair trade demands. If the United States provides such subsidies itself, its complaint against similar policies abroad may ring hollow.

In the One Hundredth Congress, five strategic trade policy proposals were offered, three in the Senate and two in the House of Representatives. In addition to the two SDI R&D foreign firm-exclusion amendments (one in each body), we include in that count the amendments to the 1987 Omnibus Trade Bill that would variously create an Independent Advanced Civilian Technology Agency, establish a Competitiveness Policy Council, and create a Council on Industrial Competitiveness.

20. U.S. Senate, *Defense Authorization Act of 1988*, 100th Cong., 1st sess, S.R. 1177.

21. Robert Z. Lawrence and Robert E. Litan, *Saving Free Trade: A Pragmatic Approach* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986).

22. Pietro S. Nivola, “More Like Them? The Political Feasibility of Strategic Trade Policy,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 30 August–2 September 1990, p. 2.

Different coalitions of support for different policies

We can distinguish in theory among these types of trade policies. But are the new fair and strategic trade policies really different in political practice from classical protectionism? Defenders of free trade commonly believe that the alternatives to free trade amount to protectionism, albeit in cleverly disguised forms. Even some of the theoreticians who developed the new trade policies doubt whether the clarity of the theoretical distinctions carries over into political practice.²³

To establish directly whether or not fair trade and strategic trade proposals are decoys for classical protectionism is nearly impossible. Tactical behavior and indirection are common in politics, trade politics included. We suggest that if the types of trade intervention are different in political practice, then the conditions that lead a member of Congress to favor or oppose the types of intervention will differ. If not, the longstanding pro- and anti-free trade coalitions should be observed at work through the voting behavior of members.

Literature review and hypotheses

To develop formal hypotheses regarding congressional trade votes, we review studies of international political economy and of Congress and join this literature to the above discussion of trade policies and politics. We frame the discussion in terms of variables that are commonly offered as explanatory variables for government trade policies: the effect of international market conditions on economic interests, national political institutions, and the beliefs of policymakers.²⁴

Economic interests

The postwar commitment of the United States to principles of free trade emerged from its position in the world and from its desire for both power and wealth. With secular decreases in relative U.S. labor productivity and in relative U.S. market size, however, strong American demands for trade policies other than free trade arose.

Employment. Public choice economists give us a basis for predicting which demands from which interests will be important.²⁵ In general, the more

23. See, for example, Bhagwati, *Protectionism*; and "A Survey of World Trade," *The Economist*, 22 September 1990, pp. 1–40. For doubts by one of the leading theoreticians, see Paul Krugman, "Is Free Trade Passé?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 1 (Fall 1987), pp. 131–44.

24. Odell, "Understanding International Trade Policies."

25. See Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,

concentrated the benefits (or harms) from trade intervention to organized economic interests, the stronger the support for (or opposition to) intervention by these interests.²⁶ Demands for protection are particularly generated by declines in employment. In addition, the level of employment related to exports in a state or a district should be associated with a member's opposition to classical protectionism. Members from high export-employment locales might, however, support fair trade proposals.

Factor advantage. The Stolper–Samuelson theorem gives us another basis for predicting which economic interests will mobilize for and against various trade policies. The theorem shows that protectionism benefits owners of factors in which that society is poorly endowed relative to the rest of the world and the producers who use the scarce factors intensively. Conversely, protectionism harms owners of factors in which the society is abundantly endowed relative to the rest of the world and the producers who use the abundant factors intensively.²⁷

In the United States, various geographic regions offer different factor advantages; thus, a producer using a given factor intensively will locate in the region where that factor is most available and cheapest.²⁸ For example, textile and shoe manufacturing use unskilled labor intensively. So, U.S. manufacturers of the textiles and shoes locate production where unskilled labor is more readily available: in the South. Because the United States does not have comparative advantage in unskilled labor intensive industries, we expect that members of Congress from the South generally will support classical protectionism. Prior to the movement of textile and shoe manufacturing firms to the South, Southern members of Congress were strong supporters of free trade, as would be expected of representatives from a region with an agricultural export base. Similarly, the U.S. West has plentiful land and other natural resources. Members from the West will be free traders, *ceteris paribus*.

1982); and Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie Young, *Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: A Political Economy in General Equilibrium* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

26. See Wendy Hansen, "The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism," *American Political Science Review* 84 (March 1990), pp. 21–46; Timothy J. McKeown, "A Liberal Trade Order? The Long-run Pattern of Imports to the Advanced Capitalist States," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (June 1991), pp. 151–72; and Wendy Takacs, "Pressure for Protectionism," *Economic Inquiry* 19 (October 1981), pp. 687–93. On export employment effects as well as for a general review of the trade vote literature, see John McArthur and Steven V. Marks, "Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection," in John S. Odell and Thomas D. Willet, eds., *International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).

27. See Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Edward Leamer, *Sources of Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984). Baldwin's analysis differs; see Robert E. Baldwin, "Determinants of the Commodity Structure of U.S. Trade," *American Economic Review* 61 (March 1971), pp. 126–46.

28. The U.S. Midwest is the most diversified region economically, and comparisons of regional effects will use the voting behavior of Midwestern members of Congress as the point of comparison.

Firms and unions. Congress has long been viewed as being susceptible to the calls of domestic business firms and their unions for trade restraint.²⁹ Because many firms whose businesses are in the domestic market and their unions long have supported classical protectionism, we should expect that members of Congress with ties to those interests will be responsive to demands for classical protectionism.

Firms with few exports are unlikely to benefit from fair trade, however, and therefore are unlikely to support it. Domestically oriented firms are also unlikely to benefit from strategic trade policies and might even be hurt, as these producers are unlikely to be the so-called winners picked by the government. Further, the interests of U.S. firms that would benefit from strategic trade policies and of those that would benefit from classical protectionism often are at odds in international trade negotiations. For example, EU trade negotiators demanded that the United States lower its textile and apparel tariffs as a condition for lowering EU barriers to U.S. computers and semiconductors.³⁰

Some union members employed in export-oriented firms might benefit from fair trade, so union influence might work for it. Unions are unlikely to oppose strategic trade; but the benefits arising from that policy are likely to accrue to high-technology firms, which tend not to be unionized in the nondefense sector.

The interests of international firms and their employees, which benefit from free trade, lie in opposition to those of domestic businesses, which favor trade intervention.³¹ Destler and John Odell found that exporting firms, retailing firms selling imports, and manufacturing firms dependent on imported inputs were relatively active and sometimes effective in opposing restrictions.³² Helen Milner found that U.S.-based multinational corporations opposed protectionist legislation, though Destler and Odell found them to be relatively uninvolved in product-specific trade disputes.³³ Both studies report that opposition to product-specific protectionism follows from the economic interests of firms that benefit from free trade. In an important study, Milner and David Yoffie examined four industries where foreign firms took market shares from the U.S. firms that had been market leaders.³⁴ They conclude that U.S. firms with

29. Schattschneider, E. E., *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935).

30. Peter Behr, "Kantor Faces Choice Between Textiles and High-Tech," *The Washington Post*, 26 June 1993, p. C1.

31. For one of the original studies, see Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), pp. 41–94. Ferguson traces the development of an internationalist group of U.S. companies and links their activities to the free trade policies of the New Deal.

32. I. M. Destler and John Odell, *Anti-protection: Changing Forces in U.S. Trade Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987).

33. Helen Milner, *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

34. Helen Milner and David Yoffie, "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands," *International Organization* 43 (Spring 1989), pp. 239–72.

substantial exports prefer fair trade, not free trade or protectionism per se, and that firms facing similar industry conditions act similarly.

Some internationally oriented businesses might support both strategic trade and fair trade policies. U.S. support for new technologies and nascent product lines is arguably less likely to provoke foreign government retaliation than would classical protectionist policies for two reasons. First, industrial policies that protect new technologies are already common practice among governments in the developed world. Second, which foreign firms will be hurt and the magnitude of their loss is far less clear than in the case of a mature technology. Some U.S. firms, therefore, may demand and receive protection at home for new product lines while still expecting to retain access to foreign markets in mature product lines.

Findings from the fields of business policy and international business suggest that firms, not industries, are the relevant unit of analysis for trade policy. Trade interventions rarely will affect firms in the same industry similarly because they differ from each other in value chains and in diversification strategies.³⁵ More important, individual firms now lobby for specific trade barriers that work to their benefit at the expense of their industry competitors. Treating industries as being homogeneous in interest is inappropriate in this light.

Contrarily, internationally oriented firms have interests in common with one other, industry differences notwithstanding, since home country trade barriers in a given product line frequently call forth retaliation by foreign governments in other product lines. The international or domestic orientation of firms is therefore a suitable grouping for analyzing business interests in this study.

The mechanisms whereby firms and unions wield influence include contributions to candidates via political action committees (PACs), lobbying, and voter mobilization. As PAC contributions and other avenues of influence tend to be collinear, PAC contributions are a useful indicator of interest group influence.³⁶

Almost all studies of Congressional roll-call voting to date, however, have failed to find effects of PACs on voting behavior, leading Janet Grenzke to assert that PAC contributions “do not maintain or change House members’ voting patterns.”³⁷ However, two recent studies have found effects in two

35. See Michael Porter, *Competitive Strategy* (New York: Free Press, 1980); and Eugene M. Salorio, “Trade Barriers and Corporate Strategies: Why Some Firms Oppose Import Protection for Their Own Industry,” D. B. A. diss., Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1992.

36. See Larry J. Sabato, *PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984); and John R. Wright, “Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives,” *American Political Science Review* 84 (June 1990), pp. 417–38.

37. Janet M. Grenzke, “Shopping in the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex,” *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (February 1989), pp. 1–24. See also Melissa P. Collie, “Voting Behavior in Legislatures,” in G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson, and M. Jewell, eds., *Handbook of Legislative Research* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Diana Evans, “PAC Contributions and Roll-Call Voting: Conditional Power,” in Allan Cigler and Burdett Loomis, eds., *Interest Group Politics* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1986).

political arenas: committee voting behavior, where information asymmetries are present; and broadscale policy outcomes, where PAC influence over longer periods of time and over repeated decisions can be more readily observed.³⁸ PAC contributions and other interest group activities might matter for trade policy in particular because informational and organizational asymmetries through which organized interests can exert influence are present.

National political institutions

Political party. Partisanship generally matters in U.S. politics, and it especially matters in Congress, where committees are organized by political party. Republicans historically supported protectionist trade policies and Democrats, freer trade.³⁹ By the late 1960s, however, congressional Republicans moved toward stronger support for free trade, and party differences on trade policy diminished. Studies of this era give conflicting views of the role of partisanship as an explanatory or mediating variable for U.S. trade policy.⁴⁰ In the 1980s, partisan differences on trade policy re-emerged. The parties had switched positions, however, with Republicans now supporting free trade and the Democrats favoring all forms of trade intervention.

Two recent versions of partisanship theory offer explanations for the reversal in partisan differences. Both see partisan change as following from economic change. According to the first, class partisanship, the two main parties historically have appealed to different economic and social classes.⁴¹ Unionized blue-collar workers and unskilled nonunion workers have always comprised important parts of the Democratic party's core constituency, and these workers have seen their real wages stagnate as their relative labor productivity declined. In recent years, the Democratic party has been committed to protecting short-term employment and to maintaining wage rates for production workers: hence it supports trade restraint.

The second version is ideological partisanship.⁴² Democrats have supported

38. See Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," *American Political Science Review* 84 (September 1990), pp. 797–820; and Dennis P. Quinn and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Business Political Power: The Case of Taxation," *American Political Science Review* 85 (September 1991), pp. 851–74.

39. Magee, Brock, and Young, *Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory*, pp. 194–201. See also Ferguson, "From Normalcy to the New Deal." Destler reports that House Republicans voted 127 to forty-three to kill the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, while House Democrats voted 210 to forty-four in its favor. See Destler, *American Trade Politics*, p. 174.

40. See, for example, Milner, *Resisting Protectionism*; and Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy." Both works omit partisanship as a variable, but Milner's work focuses on industry preferences, not on policymaking per se. Both studies are reviewed in Odell, "Understanding International Trade Policies." An important study that treats partisanship as a central variable is Ferguson, "From Normalcy to the New Deal."

41. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., *The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).

42. Dennis P. Quinn and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Economic Growth Strategies: The Effects of Ideological Partisanship on Interest Rates and Taxation," *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (August 1991), pp. 656–85.

a form of neo-Keynesian growth strategy in which promoting free trade flows is a relatively unimportant consideration compared with maintaining current domestic consumption and employment. Republicans, in contrast, have supported the neoclassical growth model in which free trade flows contribute to efficient investment by firms. The trade policy positions of the two parties are natural adjuncts to their differing use of fiscal and monetary policies in achieving their parties' macroeconomic goals. As the U.S. relative economic position decreased, the Democratic party promoted the consumption of domestically produced goods as an antidote to stagflation, whereas the Republican party stressed the importance of lower-priced inputs in reviving the economy.⁴³

Congressional committees. Congress as an institution has played a less important role in forming U.S. trade policy than the executive in the postwar era. Congress, however, exerts authority, albeit less transparently, through the committee system as well as through other "backdoor" channels.⁴⁴ The decisions of members of congressional trade subcommittees in particular influence final congressional outcomes.

In the Senate, the International Trade Subcommittee of the Finance Committee is the most powerful committee on trade matters. The Foreign Relations Committee oversees foreign policy generally.⁴⁵ In the House of Representatives, trade legislation must pass through the Subcommittee on Trade of the Ways and Means Committee. The International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee also have some jurisdiction on trade matters.⁴⁶ Senators and representatives on these committees often are seen as having a national or international orientation to trade policy and to be less responsive to the demands of narrow constituent interests.⁴⁷ In this view, committee members will be less likely to support classical protectionism than will other members.

43. Discriminating between these versions of partisanship is difficult. One way is to examine the effects of party in light of the effects of economic variables. Because unemployment, export employment, region-based factor proportions, and producer interests are directly modeled in the analysis, estimates of the effects of class partisanship should be diminished by the economic variables and vice versa: that is, these variables should be collinear. If the party variable and most or all of the economic variables are strongly significant, however, then ideological partisanship is likely to be the partisan effect at work.

44. See the discussions in Hansen, "The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism"; and Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, "Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (February 1984), pp. 49–74.

45. Whalen and Whalen, *Trade Warriors*.

46. See Walter J. Oleszek, *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989); and Whalen and Whalen, *Trade Warriors*.

47. Whalen and Whalen, *Trade Warriors*.

Policy innovations, such as fair trade and strategic trade, arise from within congressional subcommittees, but which ones? Fair and strategic trade are likely to be supported by members of subcommittees whose jurisdiction includes competitiveness, taxation, and other national economic issues. We expect, in contrast, committees whose domain includes foreign affairs generally to be less supportive of fair and strategic trade because they have an interest in maintaining good political relationships with foreign governments; fair and strategic trade often are conflictual.

Another hypothesis follows from the fact that members of Congress seek committee assignments so as to protect important constituent interests.⁴⁸ Members from districts suffering from import-related unemployment might seek trade committee assignments so as to promote trade intervention and then vote in their constituents' interests.

House and Senate. Estimates of the influence on members' votes of employment effects and of producer interests generally will likely be far stronger in the House than in the Senate. The smaller and more homogeneous House districts leave its members with fewer cross-cutting cleavages on economic issues, so employment gains or losses from trade, as well as other district-level producer interests, will matter more to House members.⁴⁹

Additionally, the individual member of the House is less influential than a senator might be on final chamber outcomes. To prevent the collective choice and free-rider problems that tend to result in such a circumstance, the House has over the years developed a strong tradition of party discipline and strong committee chair leadership. In consequence, members of political coalitions show greater discipline and group cohesion in the House than is true for the Senate.⁵⁰ The protectionist and free trade coalitions are likely, therefore, to persist longer in the House than in the Senate.

Ideology

The beliefs of members of Congress also will influence their votes on trade, but in which direction?⁵¹ Econometric studies on the effects of ideology yield apparently contradictory results. Some scholars, such as John McArthur and

48. See Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, *Congress and Its Members*, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1990); and Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973).

49. Gary C. Jacobson, *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990).

50. Oleszek, *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*, pp. 23–29.

51. See Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1963); Robert A. Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929–1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Keith T. Poole, "Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the U.S. Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13 (February 1988), pp. 117–33; and Stefanie Lenway, *The Politics of International Trade* (Boston: Pitman, 1985).

Steven Marks, show that liberalism is related to protectionism, but Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway found a positive association between liberalism and free trade.⁵² In studies of commodity-specific bills, liberalism versus conservatism appears not to be a factor at all.⁵³

These contradictory results suggest that liberalism's effects are more complex than the standard protectionist-free trade dichotomy. Since most of the above studies were done before the emergence of the new trade policy options, further investigation of the effects of ideology are warranted. Old parameter estimates may no longer be correct for predicting or explaining congressional behavior in the presence of new options.

Liberal and conservative ideology in the United States resonates in almost all policy areas, trade included, and is usually understood through the equity versus efficiency dichotomy. In this view, the ideal-type liberal is willing to incur some efficiency losses in order to obtain equity gains for less-advantaged groups as long as the efficiency losses do not adversely affect the disadvantaged in the long run.⁵⁴ Because any trade policy but free trade has some efficiency costs, we would expect conservatives to oppose all trade interventions on efficiency grounds. We would expect liberals, in contrast, to support interventions that genuinely promoted both equity and long-term global efficiency, as fair trade in particular is intended to do.

What about classical protectionism? The efficiency effects are negative, so conservatives should oppose it, but will liberals support it? The equity effects are ambiguous because they depend on the nature of the redistribution. Are the winners from protectionism low-wage workers or high-income executives? Are the losers poor people who shop at discount stores or rich people who shop at designer boutiques? Internationally, classical protectionism slows the growth of less developed countries, while advantaging less-productive firms and workers in the already-rich developed countries. Because the equity outcomes of classical protectionism are mixed, liberals should not uniformly support it.

Summary of hypotheses

We expect that at least some of the conditions that lead legislators to support or oppose free trade, fair trade, strategic trade, and classical protectionism will

52. John McArthur and Steven V. Marks, "Constituent Interest Versus Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost," *Economic Inquiry* 25 (July 1988), pp. 15–25. Compare Goldstein and Lenway, "Interests or Institutions."

53. See Stanley D. Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh, "Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade Votes," *Public Choice* 67 (August 1990), pp. 137–53; and Stephen V. Marks, "Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987," Department of State Planning and Economic Staff working paper no. 90/18, U.S. Department of State, 1990.

54. See Alan S. Blinder, *Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough Minded Economics for a Just Society* (Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1987); and Arthur M. Okun, *Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975). See also the discussion of unidimensionality below.

differ. In particular, we expect support for fair trade to come from legislators who receive large international business PAC contributions, legislators who are liberals, legislators who are in districts with high export employment, legislators who are from the West, or legislators who sit on the Senate Finance trade subcommittee. Regarding strategic trade, we expect support from legislators who receive large international business PAC contributions, legislators who are liberals, or legislators who are members of the Senate Finance trade subcommittee; strategic trade will be opposed by those with large domestic business PAC contributions. Classical protectionism will be supported, we predict, by legislators from districts with high unemployment, legislators who receive large domestic business or union PAC contributions, or legislators from the South. Classical protectionism will be opposed by legislators from the West, legislators from high export-employment districts, legislators who receive higher than average international business PAC contributions, or legislators who sit on the Senate Finance trade subcommittee.

Democratic party members will support all forms of trade intervention, we predict, and Republicans will oppose all intervention. Members of foreign affairs committees traditionally are supporters of free trade, and we expect them to oppose all forms of trade intervention. Members of the House Ways and Means trade subcommittee are also, by tradition, free traders.

Methodology

An important lesson from the literature review is that one study that examines one or a few trade votes can produce very different findings from another study that examines another few trade votes. Complicating matters, the practices of vote trading and logrolling mean that studying one or a few votes or modeling a trade vote to fit the particulars of a bill overlooks the interdependence of one set of trade votes on the total set of trade votes. To remedy these concerns, we track the entire voting record of both bodies of the One Hundredth Congress using identical explanatory variables for each contested trade vote.

We conduct the empirical analysis in two parts. First, we estimate logistic regression equations for each of thirty trade bills in the Senate and twenty trade bills in the House to learn the effects of trade policy variables on members' votes. Second, we summarize results from the first analysis, pooling all bills of the same type in the same logistic regression and then test for the statistical significance of the overall effects.

First analysis

In the first part of the study, the unit of analysis is the individual senator or representative. The dependent variable is the legislator's vote on a trade bill. A vote that favors trade intervention is scored as 1, whether the intervention is

classical protectionism, fair trade, or strategic trade. A vote against the trade intervention or for free trade is scored as 0.⁵⁵ Logistic regressions are used because the dependent variable and several independent variables are binary. Each of the thirty Senate and twenty House trade bill regressions is specified with the same list of independent variables, which represent economic conditions, interest groups, ideology, and institutions (except the House regressions contain three subcommittee memberships rather than two, as in the Senate).

In general, evidence from roll call vote analysis should be treated cautiously. First, roll call analysis treats each congressional member's preferences as being of equal intensity and does not control for vote trading and logrolling.⁵⁶ Second, some legislative decisions are made in committee and, therefore, never appear for a floor vote by the entire chamber. Analyzing roll call voting is biased against finding any influence of interest groups that works at the committee level.⁵⁷

Roll call vote analysis is useful, however, in studying trade policymaking. Every senator and representative has an important interest in trade, since the internationalization of the U.S. economy affects consumers and producers everywhere. The assumption of comparable intensity of interest is closer to reality for trade than for other less-broadscale issues.⁵⁸ Further, trade issues are examined in many committees in addition to those identified above.⁵⁹ In consequence, the ability of organized interests to block legislation from coming to floor votes is far weaker in trade policy than in other policy areas.

We employ two strategies to offset the problems mentioned above. First, to offset the bias against finding interest group influence, we study all the trade votes in a Congress. Systematic interest group influence, if it exists, should reveal itself in the aggregate. Second, to help account for logrolling and vote trading, we use a lagged endogenous variable (see below).

55. In cases where members "paired for" or "announced for" a type of trade intervention, we entered a score of 1; in cases where members "paired against" or "announced against," we entered a score of 0. We omitted from the analysis of a bill those members who either abstained or voted "present."

56. See Richard L. Hall and Bernard Grofman, "The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias," *American Political Science Review* 84 (December 1990), pp. 1149–66; and Thomas Stratmann, "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting," *American Economic Review* 82 (December 1992), pp. 1162–76.

57. Peter M. VanDoren, "Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll Call Data?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 15 (August 1990), pp. 311–40.

58. Widespread vote trading is less likely on trade votes than on narrower bills, such as the dairy, sugar, peanut, wheat, and tobacco amendments to the 1985 Farm Bill examined by Stratmann in "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting." Thirty-eight of the trade bills we studied were settled by wide vote margins, which Stratmann notes limits vote trading and logrolling.

59. Nine Senate committees drafted the Senate version of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill, and nearly two hundred conferees representing twenty-three House and Senate committees participated in the House–Senate conference on the 1987 Omnibus Trade Bill. On the 1988 bill, see Whalen and Whalen, *Trade Warriors*; on the 1987 bill, see Oleszek, *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*, p. 246.

An additional consideration for the analysis is that the bills and amendments studied are not equally important. Many of the amendments to the Textile and Apparel Trade Acts of 1987 and 1988 were distinguished from one another only by the products that the amendments sought to exclude (for example, athletic shoes and specialty fibers). Moreover, not every vote is independent of all others. For example, 1987 House vote number 318 was a rule vote to provide for consideration of the Textile and Apparel Trade Act, and 1987 House vote 319 was the a vote on the act itself. Even though the vote totals for and against votes 318 and 319 differed substantially, these votes are obviously connected.⁶⁰ If we were to exclude the less important or dependent votes, a smaller sample would result.

We do not exclude either the less important votes or the votes that are connected to other votes, however, for fear of introducing systematic bias to our analysis. Most of the (in our judgment) peripheral bills and amendments were attached to various versions of the Textile and Apparel Act and are classical protectionist proposals. To exclude these bills and amendments is to amplify in importance the fair and strategic trade policy proposals and to diminish the classical protectionist aspects of trade policy.

The inclusion of less important bills obscures some meaningful findings, however. The most important example concerns the coefficient for the Senate Finance trade subcommittee, which is significant for the three votes on final passage or veto override for the Omnibus Trade Bill but is otherwise insignificant. The Omnibus Trade Bill votes were far more important in our judgment than were the other votes we label as fair trade (mostly minor amendments to the Omnibus Trade Bill). We chose to report all the results rather than cull which votes to report, and so the analysis does not take account of the relative importance of each vote. The reader should note, therefore, that our results are not precise but rather show general trends.

Second analysis

Fifty logistic regressions are difficult for the reader to digest and interpret systematically, so we offer a second analysis that summarizes the results of the fifty regressions and tests their significance. We analyze all bills of each type together in pooled logistic regressions.

For the pooled procedure, the bills and amendments are classified according to the definitions above, with the aid of expert sources: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (various issues), *National Journal* (various issues), and Richard Whalen and R. Christopher Whalen's study. For the Senate, eight bills are fair trade bills, three are strategic trade bills, and nineteen are classical protectionist bills. For the House, seven bills are fair trade bills, two are strategic trade

60. The rule passed by a vote of 305 to 111, and the Textile and Apparel Trade Act passed by a vote of 263 to 156. Forty-nine Democrats voted for the rule but did not vote for passage of the act.

bills, and eleven are classical protectionist bills.⁶¹ The dependent variable remains the 0, 1 vote of the member of Congress.

Explanatory variables

Economic interests. Economic conditions are indicated by geographic region, by a state's export-related employment, and by the rate of unemployment in the state or district. (Details of the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix A.) Senators' and representatives' interest group support is measured by the contributions legislators receive from the PACs of international corporations, domestic corporations, and unions as a percentage of total PAC receipts.

Ideology. A member's ideology is indicated by his or her liberalism rating compiled by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).⁶² It is unclear whether this measure reflects the beliefs of the member of Congress or the views of his or her constituents (or both), so any substantive interpretation of our measure vis-à-vis the beliefs of members must be qualified (see Table 1).⁶³

National political institutions. Institutions are represented by political party, by two Senate subcommittee memberships, and by three House subcommittee memberships. We cannot directly observe the influence of these institutional variables, but the 0, 1 variables entered in the analysis commonly are employed in roll call studies as a proxy for institutional effects. For

61. A full appendix, which lists all the bills and offers a short description of each, is available from the authors.

62. For a more general discussion of ideology in U.S. politics, see Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, "On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress: A Controversy," *American Political Science Review* 85 (September 1991), pp. 955–60.

63. Jackson and Kingdon, as well as VanDoren, make the theoretical point that using ideology measures drawn from previous roll call votes to explain other roll call votes is biased. See John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon, "Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes," *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (August 1992), pp. 805–23; and VanDoren, "Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll Call Data?" We believe that we should not omit this important variable and so continue to use the ideology measure but supplement the measure with a second proxy measure of ideology (see Table 1). An objection to the ADA measure is raised by McArthur and Marks, "Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection." They offer evidence that the liberalism rating compiled by the *National Journal* is a (slightly) better predictor of members' votes on trade and economic issues than is the ADA rating. In their studies the coefficient of the *National Journal* rating was larger and more significant than that of the ADA rating, and the percentage of votes correctly predicted either did not change or increased by 1 or 2 percent when the *National Journal* rating was used. We use the ADA rating nevertheless for two reasons. First, we wish to compare our findings to previous studies of trade votes, most of which use the ADA rating as the measure of ideology. Second, we are persuaded by the studies that find unidimensionality of policy space, which suggests that members' ideological views on economic issues and social issues may not be separated; see Poole and Rosenthal, "On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress." If ideology is one construct, then the ADA measure, which is broader than the *National Journal* measure, is appropriate.

example, we assume that the roll call votes of trade subcommittee members reflect the decisions to which those committees came.

Unobservable variables. The problem of potentially influential but unobservable explanatory variables, such as logrolling and vote trading, can arise in the analysis of cross-sectional data. To capture influences not picked up by other explanatory variables, we use the technique of a lagged endogenous variable.⁶⁴ The first trade vote in each house in 1987 comprised this variable.⁶⁵ A vote for either bill is considered a trade interventionist vote. This procedure is likely to diminish some of the effects of the other independent variables, making it harder to find statistically significant results.

Results

The logistic regression models from the first analysis performed well statistically. Goodness-of-fit tests showed that all equations are successful in explaining vote outcomes. The percentage of votes correctly classified ranges from 71.4 to 97.5 percent for the fifty bills. The average correct classification rate is 85.6 percent in the Senate and 89.2 percent in the House. In contrast, the mean correct classification rate by chance with ex post knowledge is 59.9 percent.

Several patterns emerge from the logistic regressions. First, some variables are associated with many of the trade bill outcomes, while others are significant less often; for example, political party affiliation affects twenty-nine of the fifty bills, while ideology affects fifteen.

Second, under some conditions, members of Congress favor one type of trade intervention but oppose another type. In the Senate, for example, high levels of international business PAC contributions are associated with a senator's vote against classical protectionist trade bills but in favor of fair trade bills. Under other conditions, members favor one type of trade bill but appear to be indifferent to the fate of others. For example, senators from the East favor classical protectionism but not fair or strategic policies. Western House members oppose protection but are not opposed to fair or strategic trade policies.

Third, and in contrast, some variables have a consistent direction of effect on all types of trade votes. Most clearly, members of the Republican party in both houses of Congress oppose all forms of trade intervention.

64. For a discussion of the errors that result from failing to control for "unobservables," see Robert Jacobson, "Unobservable Effects and Business Performance," *Marketing Science* 9 (Winter 1990), pp. 74–95. See also Stratmann, "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting."

65. For the Senate, we used the bill to forbid the use of imported cement in U.S. federal highway projects and for the House, we used the (contested) rule vote for the Omnibus Trade Bill to calculate this variable. On the stability of congressional voting patterns, see Herbert B. Asher and Herbert F. Weisberg, "Voting Changes in Congress," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (May 1978), pp. 391–425.

Fourth, the results differ somewhat between the House and the Senate. For example, unemployment rate is not a condition for determining a senator's vote on trade bills, but members of the House are responsive to it. High levels of domestic business and union PAC contributions were among the conditions leading House members, but not senators, to support classical protectionism.


These results can be seen in part from Figures 1 and 2, but we also use a second analysis that summarizes the results and tests their significance. Three logistic regressions, one for each type of trade intervention, are shown in Table 1. The analyses perform well statistically.

The results show that both the traditional free trade and protectionist coalitions have fragmented in both congressional bodies. The coalitions of support for and opposition to the various types of trade policy differ. Liberals in both houses, for example, supported fair trade. Fair trade also was supported in the Senate by senators with ties to international business PACs and, less strongly, by senators who were members of the trade subcommittee of the Finance Committee. In the House, fair trade was supported by members of the Foreign Affairs trade subcommittee and, less strongly, by representatives from the East. Members of the Ways and Means trade subcommittee opposed fair trade strongly. Republicans, in comparison to Democrats, opposed fair trade in both houses.

Liberals in both houses also strongly supported strategic trade. In the House, they were joined by representatives from districts with high unemployment and, less clearly, by representatives on the Foreign Affairs trade subcommittee. Republican party members, however, opposed strategic trade in both houses. They were joined in the Senate by members of the Foreign Relations Committee and by senators with high levels of support from domestic business PACs. In the House, strategic trade also was opposed by members who received large PAC contributions from international businesses and by members from districts with high levels of export-related employment.


Classical protectionism, in contrast, was associated in the House with high levels of PAC contributions by domestic business and by labor unions. Representatives from high-unemployment districts also supported it. Regional effects were strong among Southerners and Easterners in both houses who supported classical protectionism and among Westerners in both houses who opposed it.⁶⁶ Members of the Republican party, senators and representatives from high-export areas, senators who received high levels of international business PAC contributions, members of the Senate trade subcommittee, and members of the Ways and Means trade subcommittee opposed classical protectionism.

66. Of course, this result is shaped by several votes on protectionist amendments to the textile import quotas bill, which were of special interest to the South and the Northeast. In another Congress, this result might not occur, though protectionist groups tend to join together in logrolling.



Bill number

FIGURE 1. Effects of explanatory variables on fair trade, strategic trade, and protectionist trade bills in the U.S. Senate, 1987-88



Bill number

FIGURE 1. continued




FIGURE 2. Effects of selected explanatory variables on fair trade, strategic trade, and protectionist trade bills in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1987-88

TABLE 1. *Logistic regressions for types of trade bills in the U.S. Congress, 1987–88^a*

Variable	Senate			House		
	Fair trade	Strategic trade	Protectionism	Fair trade	Strategic trade	Protectionism
Export employment	-0.021 (0.22)	0.029 (0.044)	-0.038** (0.017)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.139* (0.073)	-0.084** (0.021)
Unemployment	0.022 (0.051)	-0.026 (0.096)	0.017 (0.038)	0.031 (0.021)	0.144** (0.062)	0.116** (0.019)
Southern region	0.058 (0.269)	0.000 (0.557)	0.740** (0.194)	0.209 (0.140)	-0.247 (0.415)	0.566** (0.112)
Eastern region	0.254 (0.272)	-0.165 (0.558)	0.489** (0.191)	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA
Northeastern region	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA	0.395** (0.152)	0.525 (0.455)	0.820** (0.138)
Western region	-0.263 (0.234)	-0.539 (0.494)	-0.691** (0.158)	-0.050 (0.153)	-0.581 (0.521)	-0.723** (0.136)
Int'l business PAC	0.045* (0.025)	0.079 (0.053)	-0.042** (0.020)	-0.018* (0.011)	-0.063** (0.028)	-0.014 (0.009)
Domestic business PAC	0.003 (0.011)	-0.065** (0.026)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.008 (0.019)	0.013* (0.006)
Labor union PAC	0.014 (0.010)	0.017 (0.021)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036** (0.005)
Liberalism ^b	0.010** (0.005)	0.018* (0.010)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.008* (0.003)	0.028** (0.009)	0.004 (0.003)
Political party ^c	-1.048** (0.337)	-1.587** (0.630)	-1.302** (0.250)	-1.215** (0.195)	-3.089** (0.463)	-1.314** (0.170)
Senate foreign relations committee	-0.285 (0.231)	-1.089** (0.493)	-0.332** (0.153)	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA
House trade subcommittee	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA	0.536* (0.251)	1.349* (0.774)	-0.258 (0.215)
Senate trade subcommittee	0.321 (0.233)	0.436 (0.465)	-0.354** (0.166)	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA
House ways and means trade subcommittee	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA	-0.522** (0.251)	0.512 (0.774)	-0.659** (0.215)
House int'l development subcommittee	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA	-0.186 (0.252)	0.131 (0.769)	-0.103 (0.217)

TABLE 1. *continued*

Variable	Senate			House		
	Fair trade	Strategic trade	Protectionism	Fair trade	Strategic trade	Protectionism
Previous vote	0.525** (0.192)	0.222 (0.379)	0.648** (0.144)	0.668** (0.131)	-0.551 (0.472)	0.598** (0.113)
Correct classification rates						
Model	71%	80%	77%	77%	91%	81%
Chance	50%	50%	54%	58%	51%	56%

^aStandard errors are within parentheses. The dependent variable is the vote of each member of Congress, where a vote for intervention = 1 and a vote against intervention = 0. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * $p \leq .10$ and ** $p \leq .05$. The chance of correct classification rate with ex post knowledge is calculated as $p^2 + (1 + p^2)$, where p = the probability of a yes vote. For all equations, the model is calculated as an improvement over a nonmodel (with only an intercept). For all equations except House fair trade and House protectionism, the goodness-of-fit statistic permits us to accept the null hypotheses that the model fits the data.

^bIn recognition of the concern about bias in the measure of ideology, we supplemented the existing analysis with a second proxy measure for ideology: the percentage of each district that voted for Walter Mondale in the 1984 U.S. presidential election. The effects of ideology are diminished when the Mondale vote is used, either because of (1) upward bias in the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) measure or (2) the imperfect reflection of ideology in the Mondale vote. Our conclusions about the nature of the effect of liberalism are the same, however, using either measure. Among the coefficients of the other explanatory variables, few changed significance when the Mondale vote replaced the ADA measure in the analysis, and no coefficient remained significant while reversing sign.

^cRepublican = 1.

Free trade has one consistent force in its favor—the Republican party. The members of the Ways and Means trade subcommittee usually also supported free trade.⁶⁷

We outline the essential results in Table 2, which indicates the main sources of support for the various types of trade policy.

Conclusion

In this study, we assess the conditions under which members of the U.S. Congress were likely to support or oppose free trade, fair trade, strategic trade, and classical protectionism. We ask if the supporters and opponents of free trade and classical protectionism are different from those of fair trade and

67. One variable—membership on the third House subcommittee, the Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy—did not influence trade votes.

TABLE 2. *Summary of conditions that affect congressional votes on the four types of trade policy^a*

Policy	Conditions leading to support		Conditions leading to opposition	
	Senate	House	Senate	House
<i>Free trade</i>	Republican party	Republican party	Democratic party	Democratic party
<i>Fair trade</i>	Liberalism Int'l business PAC ^b (Int'l trade subcommittee)	Liberalism Int'l trade subcommittee (Northeastern region)	—	Ways and means subcommittee (Int'l business PAC)
<i>Strategic trade</i>	Liberalism	Liberalism Unemployment (Labor union PAC) (Int'l trade subcommittee)	Domestic business PAC Foreign relations committee	Export employment Int'l business PAC
<i>Protectionism</i>	Southern region Eastern region	Southern region Northeastern region Domestic business PAC Labor union PAC Unemployment	Western region Export employment Int'l business PAC Int'l trade subcommittee (Foreign relations committee)	Western region Export employment Ways and means subcommittee (Int'l business PAC)

^aConditions shown within parentheses are less important in the analysis. Importance was judged from the statistical significance of estimated coefficients, number of bills affected, consistency of effect, and whether or not key bills were affected.

^bPAC = Political action committee.

Sources. Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1.

strategic trade. More generally, we are concerned with the adequacy of the explanatory variables that scholars commonly invoke for why governments adopt trade policies: the effect of international market conditions on economic interests, the beliefs of policymakers, and national political institutions. How useful are these perspectives in understanding congressional trade policymaking in the One Hundredth Congress?

First, we find that the four types of trade policies are supported by different coalitions of interests. Fair and strategic trade are not simply protectionism in disguise. The conclusion is qualified, however, as remnants of the long-standing free trade and protectionist coalitions still are present in trade politics. Partisanship in particular is associated with either support for or opposition to all types of trade intervention in both houses. Further, the protectionist coalition clearly is evident in House voting.

The results from the economic and interest group variables are clear and suggest that market conditions affect legislators' preferences and, in this case, lead to the establishment of new government trade policies. While the finding regarding corporate and union PACs is new, our study substantively replicates the findings of Milner and Yoffie and of Destler and Odell that corporate trade preferences are not homogeneous but instead depend on the domestic or international market orientation of the firm. The effect of domestic corporate PACs is dramatically different from that of international corporate PACs. Senators who get a high proportion of their PAC contributions from international corporate PACs tend to oppose protectionist trade policy and favor fair trade. But contributions from domestic corporate PACs have no such association; instead those who receive high levels favor protectionism in the House and oppose strategic trade policy in the Senate.⁶⁸

Representatives from districts with high unemployment supported classical protectionism, and members of both houses from states with high export-dependent employment oppose it. These employment effects are consistent with studies from public choice economics. The West, Northeast, and South variables also reflect their region's general economic conditions. These conditions result in opposition to classical protectionism among Westerners and support in both houses for classical protectionism by Southern members. The regional outcomes accord with the standard international trade theory of factor proportions.

The results show some institutional and ideological effects, nonetheless. In the House, in contrast to the Senate, the protectionist and free trade coalitions are still to be found. High levels of union PAC contributions to representatives are, for example, associated with support for classical protectionism and strategic trade. In contrast, and in significant difference from the Senate, representatives who receive high levels of international business PAC money oppose fair and strategic trade. The greater tendency of the House to establish logrolling coalitions perhaps accounts for differences between the House and the Senate.

The findings regarding ideology, committee, and party deserve additional comment. Ideology was a substantial influence on trade votes in 1987–88. Our results show that liberalism influences trade policy toward fair and strategic trade in both houses but is not associated with classical protectionism in either body.

From our study, it becomes clear that ideology's effects on trade legislation are far more complex than the free trade versus protectionism dichotomy allows. The complexity arises, we believe, because the equity and efficiency

68. We should caution that the causal relationship between roll call votes and PAC contributions is not established, as these results are consistent both with the belief that PAC dollars buy members' votes and with the belief that business PAC contributions go to members as rewards for their previous support of PAC interests.

outcomes of various types of trade interventions differ, and ideologues of either camp will look to the likely equity and efficiency outcomes before casting their votes. Therefore, liberals and conservatives might not differ in voting on trade proposals where the equity and efficiency effects are ambiguous, as in the case of classical protectionism, or in cases where the equity and efficiency effects are reinforcing, as is sometimes the case with some trade liberalizing agreements. Only on trade votes where equity and efficiency are in a possible tradeoff relationship, as is possibly the case for both fair trade and strategic trade, should we expect to find differences between liberals and conservatives.

In the past, international relations scholars frequently omitted political partisanship as an independent variable because partisan differences on trade policy were regarded as minor. But here, partisanship is the strongest systematic force in our analysis. One implication of the analysis is that, as the conditions of international economic competition changed, the parties switched positions, with the Democrats now strongly favoring trade restraint.

The strength of the partisanship effect is puzzling, however, if the motivation for Democratic support of trade intervention is mainly to protect the class interests of unionized workers, unskilled workers, or workers directly harmed by import competition. These direct effects are already accounted for and are significant forces in the analysis, so the effect of partisanship is a net additional effect beyond these economic interests. Liberal versus conservative ideology is also a strong force in the analysis. What, then, is the partisanship measure picking up?⁶⁹

We believe that partisanship regarding trade policy needs to be understood as a piece of each party's macroeconomic program. Since the 1950s, ideological disagreement about the proper goals for the macroeconomy has led the two parties to adopt differing fiscal and monetary policies.⁷⁰ The trade policy positions we observed are consistent with other components of each party's macroeconomic strategy.

Subcommittee members in both the Senate and the House were important to the development of the new types of trade policy. Members of the committees and subcommittees we studied historically have tended to support free trade and oppose protectionism, as noted above. Members of the House Foreign Affairs Trade Subcommittee supported fair trade and strategic trade bills, while senators sitting on the Senate International Trade Subcommittee continued to oppose classical protectionism while supporting fair trade. Part of

69. Marks and McArthur noted that the partisanship finding has been robust across many studies but were concerned, as are we, that "the link between congressional voting and campaign contributions or party affiliation is not totally clear in theoretical terms." See Marks and McArthur, "Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection," pp. 120–21.

70. For the theoretical development of the argument and a number of tests of the theory, see Quinn and Shapiro, "Economic Growth Strategies."

the innovation in trade politics away from the free trade versus protectionism dichotomy apparently is taking place at the subcommittee level.

In the House, however, members of the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee opposed both fair trade and classical protectionism. The subcommittee's chair, Democrat Sam Gibbons of Florida, is well-known for his free trade preferences, so the study results for that subcommittee are not surprising.⁷¹ The free trade position of the subcommittee, however, is sufficiently divergent from the views of the House Democratic leadership that other committees are challenging the Ways and Means Committee for leadership in trade issues. All forms of trade intervention, fair trade bills included, passed the House, despite the opposition of the Ways and Means trade subcommittee.

Several questions of interest to scholars remain unanswered by this study. One is why members of the Senate Finance International Trade Subcommittee and the House Foreign Affairs Trade Subcommittee moved toward fair trade but members of House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee did not. Another unanswered question is why the effects of international business PAC contributions differed so substantially between the two congressional houses. A third question concerns the relationship between liberal-conservative ideology and ideological partisanship. These two types of ideology are undoubtedly connected, but further work on the structure of the beliefs of political leaders and partisans regarding economic policy is needed to further delineate that relationship.⁷²

Who won (in terms of the final enactment of bills into law), and why? An examination of Table 2 reveals that many more conditions lead to support for fair trade than opposition to it. Although members of the Republican party opposed fair trade, their opposition to it was much weaker than it was to the other types of trade intervention, and the Republicans did not control either chamber of Congress. In contrast, more forces lead to opposition to protectionism than support for it. In light of the broad range of support for and limited opposition to fair trade, we should not be surprised that it was the predominant type of trade policy enacted into law during 1987–88. The protectionist bills all failed the final hurdle of enactment.

Paradoxically, almost all the protectionist bills and amendments, especially those connected to the Textile Import Quota Bill, commonly passed both

71. Whalen and Whalen, *Trade Warriors*.

72. One clue as to a relationship is from Marks and McArthur, "Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection," p. 125. The *National Journal* rating of liberalism, when compared with the ADA rating of liberalism, has the strong effect of diminishing the probit coefficients of party by more than 65 percent. The *National Journal* rating is an economic ideology measure, so perhaps it captures some of the force of beliefs about macroeconomic policies that is manifested in ideological partisanship.

houses of Congress, often with large majorities. How can we explain this anomaly?

Destler's argument about the relationship between the President and the Congress on trade policy offers a partial resolution of the paradox. Since members were able to anticipate that protectionist bills would face presidential vetoes and would therefore not become law, their sustained opposition to classical protectionism meant antagonizing pro-protectionist constituents over legislation that would not become law anyway. Destler shows that the likelihood of a presidential veto protects members of Congress both from their constituents and from responsibility for final trade policy, yielding "protection for Congress."⁷³

The U.S. presidency was controlled by the Republican party in 1987–88, and that party's deep opposition to classical protectionism prevailed. President Clinton's support of NAFTA in the current administration reveals that he does not share the protectionist views of congressional Democrats. But, whether a Democratic President, who is seeking to both reform national health care and raise taxes while cutting spending, will be willing or able to long deviate from his party's increasingly protectionist position on trade policy remains to be seen.

In the end, we know that new types of trade intervention, supported by interests that rarely if ever back classical protectionism, are now part of the congressional trade repertoire. We also know that the coalitions of support for the different types of trade policies differ. Finally, we have shown that the free trade coalition has eroded substantially; few forces in support of free trade are left in U.S. politics.

73. See Destler, *American Trade Politics*, "A Less Protected Congress," pp. 65–104.

APPENDIX A. *Definitions and sources of study variables*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Source(s)</i>
<i>Export employment</i>	Employment directly related to manufactured exports as a percentage of total manufacturing employment in 1986, by state ^a	U.S. Bureau of Census, <i>Exports from Manufacturing Establishments, 1987</i> , Analytical Report Series, no. AR87-1-3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987)
<i>Unemployment</i>	Unemployed persons as a percentage of the labor force in 1986 ^b	U.S. Bureau of the Census, <i>Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1987</i> , 107th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988); U.S. Bureau of the Census, <i>U.S. Census of the Population, 1980: Final Report</i> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983)
<i>Southern region</i>	States in the Southern region of the United States	<i>Congressional Quarterly Almanac</i> , vol. 43 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1987); cited hereafter by title and year only
<i>Eastern region</i>	States in the Eastern region of the United States (Senate)	As above
<i>Northeastern region</i>	States in the Northeastern region of the United States (House)	As above
<i>Western region</i>	States in the Western region of the United States	As above
<i>International corporate PAC^c</i>	Contributions from international corporate PACs as a percentage of total PAC contributions; international corporations comprise either the 100 largest U.S. corporations in terms of foreign sales or the 50 largest U.S. exporters during any year during 1983–88 ^d	Federal Election Commission (FEC) data tapes: "Campaign Expenditures in the U.S.: Reports on Financial Activity of Non-party Political Committees," 1983–84, 1985–86, and 1987–88; and "The Fifty Leading Exporters," <i>Fortune</i> , various issues: 8 August 1983, pp. 88–89; 6 August 1984, pp. 64–65; 5 August 1985, pp. 60–61; 18 August 1986, pp. 50–51; 20 July 1987, pp. 72–73, and 18 July 1988, pp. 70–71 ^e
<i>Domestic corporate PAC</i>	Contributions from domestic corporate PACs as a percentage of total PAC contributions. Domestic corporations comprise all those corporations that are not international corporations by the above criteria ^f	As above

APPENDIX A. *continued*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Source(s)</i>
<i>Labor PAC</i>	Contributions from labor union PACs as a percentage of total PAC contributions	As above
<i>Liberalism</i>	Social liberalism rating by the Americans for Democratic Action	<i>Congressional Quarterly Almanac</i> , 1986
<i>Party</i>	Political party: Republican = 1 and Democrat = 0	<i>Congressional Quarterly Almanac</i> , 1987
<i>International trade subcommittee</i>	Membership on the International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee	<i>Congressional Directory</i> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987)
<i>Foreign relations committee</i>	Membership on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee	As above
<i>International trade subcommittee</i>	Membership on the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee	As above
<i>Ways and means trade subcommittee</i>	Membership on the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee	As above
<i>International development, finance, trade, and monetary policy subcommittee</i>	Membership on the International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy Subcommittee of the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee	As above
<i>Previous vote</i>	First trade vote of each house in 1987 ⁸	<i>Congressional Quarterly Almanac</i> , 1987

⁸Since data were available only for states, state data were used for each district in the analysis of the House of Representatives.

⁹Since data were not available by House district for 1986, for the House analysis, 1980 district unemployment data were used and were rescaled to 1986 statewide levels, assuming constant change from 1980 to 1986 across districts.

¹⁰PAC = political action committee.

¹¹For senators, data for 1983–88 were used (if the senators were not candidates until after 1983, data for fewer years were used). For representatives, data for 1985–86 were used. International corporations had 135 PACs in 1987–88.

¹²FEC data tapes were provided by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

¹³Domestic corporations had 1,873 PACS in 1987–88.

¹⁴In the Senate, this was bill no. 16; and in the House it was bill no. 67 (see Appendix B).

APPENDIX B. *Bill number, vote, and classification of trade bills analyzed*^a

Year	Senate			House		
	Bill no.	Type ^b	Vote	Bill no.	Type	Vote
1987	158	Fair	69–27	69	Fair	398–19
	175	Protectionist	55–41	72	Protectionist	218–214
	178	Fair	41–55	73	Strategic	187–239
	179	Protectionist	71–28	77	Protectionist	290–137
	190	Strategic	73–51	78	Protectionist	290–137
	206	Fair	65–31	114	Strategic	229–187
	208	Fair	71–27	197	Protectionist	167–237
	250	Strategic	50–45	318	Protectionist	305–111
				319	Protectionist	263–156
				424	Protectionist	351–40
				426	Protectionist	175–239
			456	Protectionist	399–17	
1988	80	Protectionist	74–45	63	Fair	340–61
	110	Fair	63–36	66	Fair	312–107
	132	Protectionist	32–64	150	Fair	308–113
	138	Protectionist	32–64	228	Fair	258–155
	169	Fair	61–37	231	Fair	376–45
	285	Protectionist	69–26	267	Free	366–40
	287	Strategic	62–33	341	Protectionist	248–150
	288	Fair	85–11	426	Protectionist	272–152
	314	Protectionist	68–29			
	315	Protectionist	71–24			
	316	Protectionist	62–34			
	317	Protectionist	60–34			
	318	Protectionist	59–31			
	319	Protectionist	59–31			
	320	Protectionist	68–26			
	321	Protectionist	66–28			
	322	Protectionist	59–34			
	323	Protectionist	59–34			
	324	Protectionist	57–32			
	329	Protectionist	59–36			
332	Free	83–9				
343	Protectionist	72–23				

^aThe vote number refers to the *Congressional Quarterly* designation. Votes are listed in chronological order. The tally shows yes votes first and no votes second. Complete descriptions of bills are available from the authors.

^bThe votes were classified as free trade, fair trade, strategic trade, or protectionist.

Source. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, various issues.